

# Town Meeting



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## What Should Be Our Program Toward Asia?

Guest Moderator: QUINCY HOWE

### Speakers

NORMAN THOMAS

JOHN C. CALDWELL



### COMING

—March 11, 1952—


**Do Critics and Reviewers Have  
Too Much Influence?**

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### THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

**JOHN C. CALDWELL**—Former attache of the United States Embassy in Seoul, Korea; former Director of the United States Information Service in China; presently Associate Executive Secretary of the Cordell Hull Foundation. Born in China of American missionary parents, Mr. Caldwell has spent most of his life in the Orient. During World War II, he was sent behind the Japanese lines in China by the Office of War Information to set up sources of underground connections. After the war, he remained in China with the Voice of America and as Director of the U. S. Information Service. In 1947 he was sent to Korea and during the elections there was in charge of the entire province. Later he was sent to Seoul where he became Deputy Director of the U. S. Information Center for all South Korea, and was Attache at the U. S. Embassy. Currently he is a Special Consultant for the Department of the Army on Korean problems. He is author of *American Agent*, has appeared on several radio programs, and has written many magazine articles about the Orient.

**NORMAN THOMAS**—Socialist leader and six-time Presidential candidate; delegate to the Indian Congress for Cultural Freedom. Norman Thomas was born in Marion, Ohio, in 1884, the son of a Presbyterian minister. He graduated from Princeton University in 1905 as valedictorian of his class. Going on to Union Theological Seminary, he was ordained and given the American Parish in East Harlem, New York, where he remained for seven years. During World War I Norman Thomas took a definite anti-war stand and was active in the American Union Against Militarism. His activity in the Socialist Party has been concentrated on winning the rights of workers to organize and in protecting their freedom of speech. He was one of the first in the country to call attention to the plight of the sharecroppers of the South and helped to organize the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. Even better known is his share in the dramatic and successful struggle against the Frank Hague machine on the issue of free speech in Jersey City, New Jersey. Mr. Thomas is active in the League for Industrial Democracy, the Workers Defense League, and the American Civil Liberties Union. He was one of the founders of and continues as contributing editor to *The Call*, official publication of the Socialist Party. He is the author of many books, the latest, *A Socialist's Faith* (1951). After his trip to India last spring, Mr. Thomas travelled extensively through Pakistan, Italy, Yugoslavia, Germany, and England.

**Moderator: QUINCY HOWE**—Associate Professor of Journalism, University of Illinois.

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# What Should Be Our Program Toward Asia?

## Announcer:

Tonight America's Town Meeting joins with the Chamber of Commerce and citizens of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in saluting Coe College on its centennial observance. We are broadcasting from the newly completed Sinclair Memorial Chapel on the Coe Campus. Affiliated with the Presbyterian Church the college is named for Daniel Coe, donor of school land.

Because of its high standards in curriculum and faculty Coe College has rightfully earned its place as one of America's finest small liberal arts colleges. Cedar Rapids is proud of its educational facilities. This thriving city itself is the location of the largest cereal mill in the world. On a per capita tonnage basis, Cedar Rapids is one of the leading export cities in the United States and the only city in Iowa to maintain a foreign trade bureau.

To Coe College and Cedar Rapids, we extend Town Hall's congratulations and best wishes for continued success and progress. Now, to preside as moderator there is the well-known author and radio commentator, and Associate Professor of Journalism at the University of Illinois, Quincy Howe.

## Moderator Howe:

Good evening, friends. Our question tonight concerns the fate of more than half the human race, plus the fate of our own country. To most Americans right now, Asia means Korea, where the prospects for an early truce look dimmer than ever. But when President Truman speaks to the American people day after tomorrow, he'll be discussing much more than Korea when he makes his plea for

a seven billion dollar foreign aid program. He'll be covering the whole world.

Now this evening we shall have our hands full here in this beautiful Sinclair Memorial Chapel at Coe College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, discussing "What Should Be Our Program Toward Asia?" The Chamber of Commerce of Cedar Rapids has also helped to make this Town Meeting possible as part of the hundredth anniversary celebration of Coe College.

But it is necessary to think in far longer time spans than a mere hundred years when we are dealing with the ancient peoples and civilization in Asia, as the first of our two speakers, Mr. John Caldwell, well knows. Mr. Caldwell was born in China of missionary parents. It was in China that he received his bringing up and early education. During the last war he returned to his native province of Fukien, where as a member of the Office of War Information, he directed all our psychological warfare along the China coast. After the war, Mr. Caldwell undertook various diplomatic assignments, including three years in Korea. Mr. Caldwell speaks Chinese; his wife, who is also American, speaks Korean.

I'm going to ask Mr. Caldwell to open our discussion by giving his views on what use he thinks we should make of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists on the Island of Formosa. How about it, Mr. Caldwell?

**Mr. Caldwell:** Mr. Howe, I believe Lenin made the statement that the road to Paris leads through Peiping and Calcutta. It seems plain that Stalin is following this plan.



Now if this be true, it is obvious that the containment of Communist China must be a primary aim in Asia, and this we cannot do by continually criticizing Chiang Kai-shek, or, for that matter, Syngman Rhee of Korea and Quirino of the Philippines. These leaders have been far from perfect, sometimes terribly blind, but they have stood up to communism in Asia.

In particular, I believe that we must give increased, properly supervised aid to Formosa. We must end the blockade that prohibits the forces of Chiang from making hit-and-run raids on the mainland of China. We must utilize the guerillas inside China, and I think we must seriously consider a blockade of Communist China.

Of course, such a program involves risk, but any forthright offensive action is risky to a degree; but it seems absurd to me that the United States, the most powerful nation on earth, should remain continually on the defensive with a brutal, morally corrupt, and really fundamentally weak communism.

**Moderator Howe:**

As we've got so much to talk about tonight's Town Meeting of the Air, I'm not going to attempt a regular introduction of our second speaker. Norman Thomas, the Socialist Party's favorite candidate for President of the United States, is so well known that I'll only say he's recently returned from an extensive trip to India and other Asiatic lands.

Mr. Thomas, you've heard Mr. Caldwell express the view that we're not making enough use of Chiang Kai-shek. How do you feel about that?

**Mr. Thomas:** I wish Chiang Kai-shek could be used somewhat

as has been suggested, but I don't think he can be. You have to deal with facts as they are, not as they might have been if we had done something different or if somebody else had done something different. And the facts as they are, in my judgment, are entirely against this attempt to conquer China again by the man who so woefully failed when he was at home in China.

I do not think, in light of what we know about history and about people who have been driven out of their homeland, that there is any reason at all to think that Chiang Kai-shek can do from Formosa what he couldn't do when he was in China. A newspaper correspondent tells me that one of the last acts of Chiang Kai-shek's generals, if not Chiang Kai-shek, was actually to sell some of the arms we had given him to Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China, so that the arms in Indo-China came that way.

I do not think we can use Chiang Kai-shek as has been said. I think we have no moral right to let him do that which we will not back him in doing, and we cannot afford to invest our boys in what might be not a limited war but an unlimited war in China. There just aren't enough of us.

I think instead that we've got to accept the situation and seek, as a minimum, of course, the restoration of South Korea and then a general negotiation for non-aggression from outside, one country to another — non-aggression against Formosa, non-aggression from China into Indo-China, and so on.

**Moderator Howe:** He doesn't think, Mr. Caldwell, that you're very realistic. What do you think of Mr. Thomas, Mr. Caldwell?

**Mr. Caldwell:** I'm afraid that Mr. Thomas is really not dealing in facts. For one thing, the pro

rogram I've outlined here is of a type which would save us American lives. I'm not even suggesting that Chiang Kai-shek is able at the present time to reconquer all of China. He can't do it. But it seems absurd to me that we have an army of two or three hundred thousand men on Formosa. We don't even let them make hit-and-run raids. We don't let them put any pressure on the communists.

I think that is absurd militarily, and it's the kind of defensive action we simply must change, lest we find ourselves eventually with all of Asia overrun by the Chinese Communists.

**Mr. Thomas:** I think the exact opposite. We couldn't do that without also removing the blockade and letting Mao try his hit-and-run on Formosa, and I'd put my money—I'm sorry to say—on Mao, not because I like Mao better, but because of the stern facts as they are.

Moreover, I want to tell you that this hit-and-run policy would lose us our actual and potential friends in Asia and in Europe. I've been in India and Pakistan and I know.

A friend of mine was acting as interpreter the other day for a delegation of non-communist French workers in this country, and they seriously said to him that they thought American workers ought to plan a general strike if there was any more aggression by our people—that was their term—in Asia. Winston Churchill, who is as near being our friend as anybody in England, told the House of Commons this: "Nothing would be more foolish than for the armies of the United States or the United Nations to be engulfed in the vast areas of China"—and listen—"and few adventures

could be less useful or fruitful than for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to plunge onto the mainland of China." If you can't get the old Lion of the Empire on your side in this, you had better not try. We would lose more than we would gain, and you cannot hope to conquer communism by offending the misinformed feelings, if you like, of the people of Asia and Europe.

**Moderator Howe:** Mr. Caldwell, you've lived among the Chinese. You were brought up among them. Do you think they really are as hostile to us, and the people of Asia, generally, as Norman Thomas suggests?

**Mr. Caldwell:** No. The people of China are not hostile to us, and incidentally there are two little points in connection with this discussion I'd like to make. One is that the government of Mao is the most unpopular government in China's history. It has very little popular support. It keeps going by the most rigid police state in the world's history. And the second point is, and I'm sure Mr. Thomas would want to argue with me about it, but I think the facts are there, that Formosa today is one of the bright spots in Asia. It is well governed.

Many lessons have been learned by the Chinese, and it is just simply foolish to blame poor old Chiang for things that happened several years ago, to even repeat the stories such as Mr. Thomas repeated about him selling arms to Ho Chi Minh. I just don't believe that. That sounds like communist propaganda, frankly.

**Mr. Thomas:** It isn't. The man who told me that had been in Indo-China and he is as far from being a communist as you are.

I also want to correct the moderator, which is never a wise thing



to do. The moderator implied that I thought the Chinese all liked Mao. I do not. I don't think the Russians all like Stalin, but I'm not suggesting that we send a few raiders there to find out. The plain truth is that a paper as much anti-communist as the *United States News and World Report* in an article on inside Communist China is obliged to admit that whatever the people think of Mao, this is about the first time that there has been one powerful central government; and judging by the way the Chinese have fought in Korea, I think they'd fight if Chiang attacked, or even if some of us went along.

This use of Chiang is out, and it's because I think Formosa deserves protection that I want to keep the blockade and no aggression either way.

**Moderator Howe:** The point I was trying to make was not that Mao Tze-tung was popular with the Chinese, but that the Americans are unpopular.

**Mr. Thomas:** I don't know whether they are unpopular. They certainly fought our soldiers plenty.

**Mr. Howe:** Mr. Caldwell, do you think we are unpopular with the Chinese?

**Mr. Caldwell:** No, I think it's a misconception in this country that we are today terribly unpopular with the Chinese people, or with the people of most of Asia. We actually are not, but of course most of the Chinese people are so completely under the communist dictatorship that we can get no expressions of friendship anymore. But I think it is there.

**Mr. Thomas:** Let me say that I don't think that we're completely unpopular. I'm very thankful for the demonstration of affection given to Eleanor Roosevelt who

is a very good unofficial ambassador in Pakistan and in India. I've been in both countries. I don't think we're exactly unpopular, but I spoke to lots of audiences of all sorts in both Pakistan and India, and I assure you I do not think I saw one man who would countenance the idea of the use of Chiang with our help and backing and support on the mainland of China. That's just a fact.

**Mr. Howe:** I think we might get on to another area here which comes in in connection with Korea, and that's how about Indo-China? What should we do about French Indo-China? Mr. Caldwell, what are your views on that?

**Mr. Caldwell:** I have some views that I'm afraid that Mr. Thomas is going to jump on. I'm afraid he's going to misunderstand. There is no necessity of talking in terms of vast American or United Nations armies in Asia, but I think we must be prepared for air help, for naval help, for specialized leadership, if Indo-China is seriously attacked; and of course it's being attacked right now. We simply cannot let the Chinese Communists get these vast rice bowls of Asia because that is what they need desperately at the present time.

**Mr. Thomas:** I think you have to distinguish between an attack on Indo-China from China, which is one thing, and the success of the native Indo-Chinese, even if they are communists, against a corrupt and inefficient French Colonial Rule. Now I think that corrupt rule is better, probably, in the long run for the Indo-Chinese than communism would be; but there are some things that happen.

'Communism has the force of a kind of religion—I think an evil

religion—for some of its followers, and it has strength. We did a terrible thing in just turning Indo-China back to the French—who had lost it, who had misgoverned it, who had an opium monopoly there, who did nothing for education—without stipulating that there should be what the English gave in India—unconditional promise of independence.

We could have saved, we and the French could have saved, I am convinced, Indo-China. I think we may still save it. I don't want Ho Chi Minh to win, even without Chinese help. He's the leader, you know, there.

On the other hand, I do not want us deeply involved—we'd lose more than we gain, and I still think even at the eleventh and a half hour that we ought to insist that the French everywhere in North Africa and certainly in Indo-China get evidence of a definite intention to end their corrupt and dying colonial policy. On that basis, we might get somewhere.

**Mr. Caldwell:** Let me get in here. That same issue of *U. S. News and World Report* which you refer to points out that already there are 10,000 Chinese communists in Indo-China. I think that the program that you have outlined is just not sane. You want to wait until there are obvious large masses of Chinese in Indo-China, in Burma, perhaps in India. If you wait that long, it's going to be too late. We will find ourselves lost. We must be willing. Unless we write our failure right now, we've got to be willing to give the specialized type of help that is needed to bolster those governments.

**Mr. Thomas:** I am not saying definitely what should or should not be given. We need to know

more than we now know. I am saying that you have no right to consider this one problem—in which, I agree, a communist victory would be bad—without considering the whole world and the relative strength of the United States and how many of our boys we want to risk in Indo-China. The business of saving Western man, and democracy, of the idea of freedom and fellowship is extraordinarily difficult. We need above all things the cooperation of Western Europe. We need to hold places like India and the rest, and we have to consider their opinion of what we do and we have to think of our strength and we may have to think of the balance of evils in the matter.

I think that actually the most unrealistic thing I know of is the talk I hear all over America—I don't mean you, lots worse than you—to this effect: "Well, we shouldn't have gone to war in Korea, but we should have won the war," and a "limited war in Korea is no good but you can win a limited war in Indo-China or China." That latter proposition is utter nonsense.

**Mr. Howe:** Now getting back a little to the actual program here, "What Should Be Our Program in Asia?" Have you got any specific things or not, Mr. Caldwell? Point 4, for example, economic aid—what should we do there that perhaps we're not doing?

**Mr. Caldwell:** Well, obviously we have to give tremendous amounts, not necessarily tremendous amounts of dollars, but we have to give aid to help create the economic conditions which after all, are the best defense against communism. But I'm afraid very much that in the past that we haven't put enough strings on this aid, and we haven't had the ability,



somehow, to reach the rulers of countries and make those rulers see that that aid is used properly for the country's benefit.

Now that's a tremendous challenge to American diplomacy, and quite frankly I think we've not measured up to it yet. I think our diplomats have not seen what it is we have to do today. It's a hard job to give aid, to have strings on it and to see that the aid is honestly and properly used, but I have enough faith in America to believe that we can do it.

**Mr. Thomas:** There I agree with Mr. Caldwell. The only place I disagree with him is this, that he just told me a while ago that we shouldn't put strings on our aid to the French in Indo-China. I think we should begin by putting a few strings on there.

I agree that you need strings. They ought to be the right kind of strings. I do not believe, given the hypersensitive nationalism of these new nations in India, that we should say, "Now, boys, come up and sign on the dotted line that you're on our side against Russia or we won't give you a nickel." That offends them. I know how offensive that was regarded in India and in Pakistan. I think that the way in which our Ambassador, Mr. Cochran, in Indonesia carried on negotiations—and this I know from many sources—is rather high-handed aloofness even from other Americans. His insistence that the Indonesians sign on the dotted line lost us what we could have got, namely, Indonesian support. You remember the cabinet fell, because it did sign on the dotted line. That kind of dictation won't go.

On the other hand, I think it is necessary and desirable that there should be strings like this: I don't think we should pour in aid to the

Philippines without being sure that there is a land program of reform, and that goes throughout Asia, including the Middle East. Is it in order, now, to tell some figures, or do you want them to come later?

**Mr. Howe:** Just one point that you raise. I'd like to get Mr. Caldwell's angle on it. You mentioned the poor job that some people are doing there. Other people have done a pretty good job for us, in these foreign posts, like Ambassador Grady in Iran, haven't they?

**Mr. Caldwell:** Yes, it certainly wouldn't be fair to say that all of our diplomats have failed. That's not true, but I think that generally speaking, we have failed to realize that diplomacy today is something quite different than it was a hundred years ago, and we have a hard job in this business of putting strings of the kind to force governments to reform. I certainly agree with Mr. Thomas that it's something that we have to do, and I think one of the most important things we must think about here in America is how we can select the proper personnel to administer any Point 4 or economic aid programs we have in the future. They must be properly and realistically administered or they can do more harm than good, and I think you'll have to agree with me on that point, too.

**Mr. Thomas:** I agree with you with all my heart. I also want to agree with you that we've had some excellent hard-working people in the diplomatic service. I think you were one when you were there. And I wish there had been more men who knew as much as you did about China who were on the job.

I got from the State Department some figures that might interest the audience, visible to me



and invisible. In 1951, the total of all aid to all Asians, that means Middle East as well as Far East, was \$556,250,000, of which \$120,000,000 was economic and \$396,250,000, or approximately that, was military. This aid is exclusive of the loan to India to buy wheat, which loan amounted, I think, to \$190,000,000 to furnish two million tons of wheat. I was there during the famine and I know how desperately that was needed.

Now I'd like—maybe Mr. Caldwell who comes from Tennessee, is too modest to claim credit—but I'd like to say that there is a Tennessean, I think he's a Tennessean, named Horace Holmes, who is doing exactly what Mr. Caldwell and I think should be done. He'll tell you more about him, I imagine, but he is now in a place in India called Etawah, or however you pronounce it. He has in a space of a little over a year taught the natives to double the yield of wheat by proper plowing, proper planting, use of compost, and so on. He has raised the average yield of wheat, which

is pathetically low in India, in that part of India, from 13 to 26 bushels per acre and potatoes from 119 to 235. I think that's good. Congratulations to Tennessee.

**Mr. Caldwell:** That story of Horace Holmes is a very excellent illustration of what a man can do to sell other people, so-called ignorant people, on adopting new practices. Mr. Holmes used to be a county agent down in Tennessee, and somehow he has gotten the ability—the humility, perhaps—to reach the people of that section of India and to sell his program; and I am convinced we can do it all over Asia if we get the right people properly selected, properly trained, beforehand.

**Mr. Thomas:** And I think it won't cost more than we've spent on the economic, after we've learned how to do it right. And that's a Christian notion and it's a humane notion, and I want to tell you that even if there were no communists, we'd have a hard time keeping peace in a world where 50 per cent of the whole inhabitants are as hungry as the inhabitants of this world.

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## QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

**Mr. Howe:** Now I think the time has come when we can hear some questions from our audience. I think the first question is for Mr. Caldwell.

**Man:** Mr. Caldwell, what effect, if any, have the teachings of American missionaries on people of Asia in their attitude toward communism?

**Mr. Caldwell:** That is an excellent question and I'm very glad you asked it, because I sincerely believe that the work of the missionaries has been to date the greatest defense against communism. I think that we can have

a tremendous lesson from the missionaries that we could copy in diplomacy. They have made friends for us. I think that when all of this is over, a lot of those friends will still be there to rally around us.

**Man:** Mr. Thomas, if we are to attach too many strings to our aid, wouldn't it lead to resentment rather than the fostering of good feeling?

**Mr. Thomas:** That depends on how we attach the strings and what they are. It's *how* you do things. Ideally, I do not think this immediately attainable. I'd like to

see economic aid under the general aegis of the United Nations, and I'd like to see it supported by agreement among governments concerned that there would be a kind of peace tax in proportion to ability to pay, so that rich Hindus would contribute, too, as well as Americans, and on a cooperative basis. I can think of a lot more things than the time permits me to say that could be done in the way strings are attached, the techniques of it, and the kind of strings. Some strings ought not to be attached.

*Man:* Mr. Caldwell, is it right, or could you justify in your mind that the Chinese Nationalists though they are not in power in China, represent China in the United Nations?

*Mr. Caldwell:* Yes, I think legally there is a definite justification, if you want to be legal, because the government of China was overthrown by force from without, and that is the legal justification of their people in the United Nations today.

*Mr. Thomas:* I'd like to answer that. Once Mao started to shoot his way into the United Nations. I think we had to say *no* to that. That's a form of blackmail that would end the United Nations. But I have thought for a long time that the proper thing to do would be to declare China's seat vacant, because it doesn't make sense to Chinese or anybody else that a man who has to stay in Formosa, protected by the American Fleet, should be recognized as the government of China. You don't have to recognize the others. You can say that until we are convinced there is a government which has vote force, power in its country and the willingness to act decently, the seat is vacant.

*Mr. Howe:* Since we've just

heard from Mr. Thomas, let's have another question now for Mr. Caldwell.

*Man:* Mr. Caldwell, how, after losing the confidence of Asians, can we now at this late hour best manage our foreign policy to regain that confidence?

*Mr. Caldwell:* First, we must get off the defensive. We've got to have a plan. We're the most powerful nation in the world, but I think we're mentally inert, as far as Asia is concerned. We've got to have a good program that must include a propaganda program that reaches the hearts and minds of the people, that effectively answers the lies of communism, that doesn't sit on the fence. We've got to have better people in our vast and ever-growing foreign service, and I think above all we must show the people of Asia that we are not going to be pushed around by the Chinese Communists.

*Man:* Mr. Thomas, what effect do you think it would have upon Asia if we followed non-violence nationally and spent billions instead for the betterment of the world?

*Mr. Thomas:* I don't know what effect it would have on Asia altogether. I know pretty well from sad experience with communism what effect it would have on Stalin. He would say that we are easy marks. In other words, non-violence will not stop Stalin. Even Gandhi didn't believe in non-violence so much but what he blessed the dispatch of Indian troops to Kashmir.

I am for more economic aid. I am passionately for a crusade for universal control disarmament, of which I have written and spoken hundreds of times, but I say to you sorrowfully that I do not believe that a completely disarmed America, simply by kindness,



would protect itself against communism—the rival religion of communism; and I am not sure that it would command respect even in Asia. I think we should argue for universal disarmament.

I think we shall make a beginning of a cooperative war against poverty better from a position of strength, as the world counts strength, rather than weakness.

*Mr. Howe:* As your moderator, I should in candor report that at many points there, Mr. Caldwell was not in agreement with Mr. Thomas.

*Lady:* Mr. Caldwell, can we be sure that United States is being credited for giving aid, or are the Russians able to propagandize it for their own benefit?

*Mr. Caldwell:* Yes, the Russians are able to make capital, sometimes, of the things that we do and in that connection it's not so much the aid that we give, but frankly it's the way we have begun to live in our vast diplomatic establishments. The Russian line, as most of you know, is that we are an imperialistic nation, that we're trying to enslave the rest of the world; and I'm afraid that by the way we set up our huge embassies, like ours in Korea before this war started, the largest that has ever been set up, something like 1500 people, and the way we live, it does play into their hands. It gives them a sort of ammunition they can use to prove their point that we are imperialistic, that we are not there to help the people, that we are there to get all we can out of the people.

*Mr. Thomas:* Amen.

*Mr. Howe:* Our two speakers are developing a dangerous degree of agreement here tonight. Let's hear the next question for Mr. Thomas and maybe Mr. Caldwell will disagree.

*Man:* Mr. Thomas, will India lean toward the hand that feeds it best?

*Mr. Thomas:* That's a good question, and yet I think it's oversimplified. There are so many factors, ideological, emotional, and what not that go into the picture. Nevertheless, I will say this, that if with our abundance, which we have advertised through the Voice of America, we say we are richer than sin, I mean richer than Croesus, and richer than everybody—if having all that, we had not even loaned money for India's famine, it would have been very bad. I was in India during a part of that discussion, and the way the Congressmen talked was very bad. What redeemed the situation was that Nehru didn't always talk so wisely himself.

Now one of the things that's the matter right now is the tendency of Congressmen to talk too much the wrong way with an idea of political advantage rather than the reputation of America. (*Applause*)

They don't do it just at home. Now the way you clap I want to tell you that the worst thing about most Congressmen is that they're so representative. (*Laughter*) Now let me go on and say that an Asian diplomat told me that he liked America very much, but that they worked like everything in election year. He said: "It takes you so long to have an election and you say so many things and you scare the living daylight out of us." Now it's things like that that enter into the picture as well as the aid. It isn't a simple thing, and after all you can't just buy friendship—you've got to be a friend. I'd like to point out that I don't think even children really love Santa Claus, they hope to get something out of him next year if they're good.

*Mr. Howe:* Now a question for Mr. Caldwell.

*Man:* Mr. Caldwell, can China feed herself adequately without outside help?

*Mr. Caldwell:* No, China has always had a very large deficiency in rice, which to the Chinese is tremendously important. During the pre-war days, the Chinese imported vast quantities of rice from Thailand, from Indo-China, and China is not able at the present time to feed herself.

*Mr. Howe:* Now a question for Mr. Thomas.

*Man:* Mr. Thomas, should the United States as a free nation come out openly, favoring the independence of nations in Asia now under the British, French and Dutch?

*Mr. Thomas:* Well, I think the question needs a little revision. The British have given freedom, complete independence, to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. The only place they still hold is Malaya, and in Malaya it is peculiarly true in my judgment that the communist movement is scarcely more than a movement of bandits. Wouldn't you agree to that?

*Mr. Caldwell:* That's right.

*Mr. Thomas:* I do not think that it has the vitality of the native communist movement in Indo-China. In Indonesia the Dutch reluctantly and not too gracefully finally granted independence, largely under American pressure, not always too tactfully or too well applied. The French are sort of problem children, because you've got them hanging onto little bits of real estate in India. You've got their poor policy in Indo-China and their very poor policy in North Africa. I think we have got to speak quite plainly in favor of ultimate independence, and by ultimate I don't mean in geological terms.

*Mr. Howe:* Mr. Caldwell, would you like to say something on that?

*Mr. Caldwell:* Yes, I certainly agree that we must try to foster independence for the remaining colonial areas which are capable of independence. I think we have to be a little careful and not create a situation with the French right now over this question of independence that would lose us Indo-China to the communists. That would be my only objection to Mr. Thomas' point.

*Mr. Thomas:* Well, I'll admit we're in an awful hole, and it's a good deal our fault—going way back to the Cairo Conference—that we're in the hole, so I suppose we ought not to be too self-righteous.

*Lady:* As a student from Thailand, I would like to ask Mr. Caldwell if you agree or disagree that it would be wise for America to continue and increase aid to independent and free countries like mine before communism sets in?

*Mr. Caldwell:* Yes, certainly; particularly what we call Point 4 aid, which means very simply aid which tries to teach better techniques so that the men and women of countries like yours can have a better understanding of living. I can't emphasize too much the fact that the very best weapon against communism is economic stability. I think Mr. Thomas would agree with me on that—enough to eat, enough to wear, and a decent housing is the greatest defense we have against communism.

*Mr. Thomas:* If I hadn't said "Amen" before I'd say it now.

*Lady:* Mr. Thomas, should we have a bi-partisan foreign policy in Asia instead of having one party's foreign policy and another merely opposed or acting as critic?

*Mr. Thomas:* Whenever it's pos-



able without sacrificing principle or very important differences of honest opinion, there should be a uniform American policy—not just bi-partisan, it should be American. Ideally, I think the President of the United States before this or even now should call together leaders of both major parties and all the major candidates and put before them the serious questions that confront us and say, "Gentlemen, let's see how far we can agree, how far we can tell the American people we agree; and where we disagree, let's put the thing plainly and unemotionally." I think we could do a lot better job than we're doing, but the important thing isn't bipartisanship. The important thing is the right policy arrived at with the greatest possible unanimity of support consistent with honesty, and that requires very different methods than the rival candidates are following now who deliberately and in generalized terms magnify differences in order to catch votes. (Applause)

*Man:* Mr. Caldwell, if Mao's government is so unpopular, why not let the Chinese deal with him without our arms?

*Mr. Caldwell:* For a very simple reason. In a communist country, after the police state takes over, there is absolutely no chance for the people to rise unless they have some sort of outside help. The Chinese have been embarking on a purge during the last two years that is probably beyond anything the world has ever seen. They have liquidated literally hundreds of thousands of the opposition. Everyone in China today is controlled. It is the truth that it's the first time in China's history that it has had this sort of control, and the control is such that unless there is outside help of some type that there is little chance of a suc-

cessful revolution.

*Mr. Howe:* There have been so many questions raised this evening that I'm going to give each of our two speakers one minute now at the end to sum up their views of what should be our program toward Asia. Mr. Thomas.

*Mr. Thomas:* We are conditioned, but not absolutely determined by our own past mistakes and other folks' mistakes, for some of which there were excuses in the difficulties of the time. As it is, given our responsibility throughout the world and given our American strength, which is limited, I think we want to seek non-aggression agreements, the end of strife by every means, more imaginative means than we've used, the minimum condition being the restoration, at least, of South Korea. That is a minimum essential. Beyond that I think we have got to improve our propaganda of democracy, we have got to improve what we have called tonight Point 4 aid. We have got to win more actively to our side the peoples outside of the Iron Curtain countries and to consider their weaknesses.

*Mr. Howe:* Mr. Caldwell?

*Mr. Caldwell:* I think above all that we have to develop a Voice of America, and I mean by that everything that we do that is spiritually strong. We have to be as sold on democracy as the communists are on communism, and so far, I'm afraid we haven't acted as well as we should all over the world.

There was a question asked about the work of missionaries. It seems to me tremendously important for us to realize that if it were possible for our missionaries, working against tremendous odds, to sell as intangible a thing as Christianity, we should, with the

huge resources of government, be able to sell democracy. And I believe we will have to work in the same manner the missionaries did: with humility, by learning about the people, by having a sense of dedication. I am convinced myself that only when we are dedicated in this fight against communism can we win.

*Mr. Howe:* Thank you, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Caldwell, for

your interesting observations on tonight's subject. Thanks also to the members of our audience for all their questions and our appreciation to Town Meeting's Cedar Rapids host, Dr. H. H. Brooks, President of Coe College, George Layton, Public Relations Director here, and the officers and members of the Cedar Rapids Chamber of Commerce. So plan to be with us next week and every week at the sound of the Crier's Bell.

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## FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THIS WEEK'S TOPIC

### Background Questions

1. Are our economic and military objectives in Asia compatible?
2. What part does foreign aid play in our Asian policy?
  - a. Should we give foreign aid only on condition that recipients declare their allegiance to the free world?
  - b. Do such demands constitute undue interference with the affairs of foreign countries?
  - c. If we do not insist on any assurances, how can we be sure our aid doesn't get into Communist hands?
  - d. Are we winning or losing Asia's friendship as a result of foreign aid?
3. How can we help the countries of Southeast Asia to make the transition from colonies to independent states without going Communist in the process?
  - a. To what extent should we be concerned with internal affairs in these countries?
4. How can we prevent further aggression in Asia?
  - a. Should we sponsor a Pacific Pact similar to the Atlantic Pact?
  - b. Is military security the major problem in Asia?
5. Is Point 4 an effective contribution to our Asian policy?
6. What should be our policy toward China?
  - a. Should we fight Red China until it is overthrown and the Nationalists are restored, or should we be prepared to negotiate with the Mao regime?
  - b. How shall Formosa's future be decided?
  - c. Should the British and American policies toward China be coordinated?
7. What policy should we follow in Korea?
  - a. Should we make concessions at the truce talks or "sit tight"?
  - b. Should we pull out of Korea or exert greater military pressure against the enemy?
8. Should we turn Asia's problems over to the United Nations?
9. What should we do if the French are unable to hold Indo-China?
  - a. Should we help the French now?
  - b. Should we wait until they ask for assistance?
  - c. Should we avoid further involvement in Asia?



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
- No. 3 **"What Should We Do About the Communist Threat in Asia?"** Cong. John M. Vorys, H. R. Knickerbocker, Harold R. Isaacs, J. J. Singh. (May 17, 1949)
- No. 19 **"How Can We Advance Democracy in Asia?"** Begum Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Mrs. J. L. Blair Buck, Walter White. (Broadcast from Karachi, Pakistan, September 6, 1949)
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